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JACQUES DUBUCS & MATHIEU MARION 
RADICAL ANTI-REALISM AND SUBSTRUCTURAL 
LOGICS 
1. INTRODUCTION 
According to the realist, the meaning of a declarative, non-indexical sentence is the 
condition under which it is true and the truth-condition of an undecidable sentence 
can obtain or fail to obtain independently of our capacity, even in principle, to 
recognize that it obtains or that fails to do so.1 In a series of papers, beginning with 
‘Truth’ in 1959, Michael Dummett challenged the position that the classical notion 
of truth-condition occupied as the central notion of a theory of meaning, and 
proposed that it should be replaced by the anti-realist (and intuitionistic) notion of 
assertability-condition. Taken together with work from Dag Prawitz, Dummett’s 
work truly opened up the anti-realist challenge at the level of proof-theoretical 
semantics.2 There has been since numerous rejoinders from partisans of classical 
logic, which were at times met with by attempts at watering down the anti-realist 
challenge, e.g., by arguing that anti-realism does not necessarily entail the adoption 
of intuitionistic logic. Only a few anti-realists, such as Crispin Wright and Neil 
Tennant, tried to look instead in the other direction, towards a more radical version 
of anti-realism which would entail deeper revisions of classical logic than those 
recommended by intuitionists.3 In this paper, which is largely programmatic, we 
shall also argue in favour of a radical anti-realism which would be a genuine 
alternative to the traditional anti-realism of Dummett and Prawitz. The debate about 
anti-realism has by now more or less run out of breath and we wish to provide it 
with a new lease on life, by taking into account the profound changes that took place 
in proof theory during the intervening years. We have in mind in particular the 
considerable development within Gentzen-style proof theory of non-classical, 
substructural logics other than intuitionistic logic, which seriously opens up the 
possibility that anti-realism, when properly understood, might end up justifying 
another logic, and the development of closer links between proof theory and 
computational complexity theory that has renewed interest in a radical form of anti-
realism, namely strict finitism. 
We shall first provide the outline of an argument in favour of a radical form of 
anti-realism premised on the need to comply with two principles, implicitness and 
immanence, when trying to frame assertability-conditions. It follows from the first 
principle that one ought to avoid explicit bounding of the length of computations, as 
is the case for some strict finitists, and look for structural weakening instead. In 
order to comply with the principle of immanence, one ought to take into account the 
difference between being able to recognize a proof when presented with one and 
being able to produce one and thus avoid the idealization of our cognitive capacities 
that arise within Hilbert-style calculi. We then  explore the possibility of weakening 
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structural rules in order to comply with radical anti-realist strictures. 
2. FROM TRADITIONAL TO RADICAL ANTI-REALISM 
It has been granted by Dummett himself, in his 1972 postscript to ‘Truth’, that his 
original challenge against the notion of truth-conditions is easily met by the realist 
(1978, 23-4). The realist wishes not to identify what makes a sentence true or false 
with that by which we recognize it as true or as false but the anti-realist argues that 
understanding of a statement consists of the knowledge of ‘recognizable 
circumstances’ that determine it as true or false. Thus, the anti-realist finds the 
knowledge of the conditions under which a sentence is, say, true, when that 
condition is not one which is always capable of being recognized as obtaining, to be 
a rather obscure notion. It is open to the realist to agree with the anti-realist that 
truth-conditions should not, in that sense, be transcendent. However, in order for the 
realist to recover her position it suffices that she claims by the same token that any 
given truth may be recognized by an hypothetical being whose cognitive capacities 
may exceed our limited ones. So, the difference between the anti-realist and the 
realist reduces to this crucial point: the former interprets ‘capable of being known’ 
as ‘capable of being know by us’, the latter interprets it as ‘capable of being known 
by some hypothetical being whose intellectual capacities and powers of observation 
may exceed our own’ (Dummett 1978, p.24). It follows from this that, in order to 
have a veritable case against realism, the anti-realist should avoid defining 
assertability-conditions in terms of the cognitive abilities of an hypothetical being 
and define them in terms of our own, limited human cognitive capacities. 
Any definition of assertability-conditions along those lines should satisfy two 
principles, namely that, first, conditions under which the assertion of a sentence is 
justified must, when satisfied, always be recognized as being satisfied and, secondly, 
that the definition of the conditions under which the assertion of a sentence is 
justified must, as is the case with classical definitions of truth-conditions, avoid 
making an explicit appeal to our cognitive capacities. We shall call these, 
respectively, the principles of ‘immanence’ and ‘implicitness’. The former derives 
from the very nature of the anti-realist challenge against realism: if it were not 
always the case that, when satisfied, assertability-conditions are recognized as being 
so, then the anti-realist position would allow for ‘transcendent’ conditions and 
would simply not vary significantly from a realist position. The raison d’être of the 
principle of implicitness should also be obvious. If we wish assertability-conditions 
to play the role played by truth-conditions, which do not contain any reference to 
psychological content, then we must abstain from defining assertability in terms that 
would presuppose that the nature of our cognitive capacities is known and thus 
analyse these capacities in a neutral, non-indexical language in which they do not 
appear as ours. As is already the case with truth-conditions, which they are supposed 
to replace, assertability-conditions must therefore be formally defined, that is that it 
must be possible unambiguously to indicate the conditions under which we are 
automatically justified to assert a complex statement in function of the conditions 
justifying the assertion of its immediate constituents: it should not be necessary to 
wonder, on the occasion of each application of one of the clauses of this recursive 
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rule, if the assertion to which we are entitled to by this rule really is the assertion of 
a statement that our own cognitive capacities would, alone, allow to recognize as 
true.  
The principle of implicitness allows us to rule out some candidates for 
assertability-conditions. We have in mind here strict finitist variants that could be 
developed along lines first propounded by A. S. Esenin-Volpin (1961, 1970). The 
term ‘strict finitism’ seems to cover two conflicting theses about the central notion 
of ‘feasibility’: Gandy’s Thesis, according to which there is an upper bound B, 
independent of time, to the size of mathematical inscriptions that can be considered 
by mathematicians, in particular, if n > 2B, then the numeral for n cannot be 
concretely presented, i.e., it is not feasible; and the Karp-Cook Thesis according to 
which a set of strings is feasibly computable if and only if it is polynomial-time 
computable.4 This approach to feasible computing is linked rather with a finitist or 
Aristotelian ontology of infinities that are conceived of as unbounded processes as 
opposed to totalities, and it thus clashes with rejection of large finite numbers by 
those adhering strictly to Gandy’s Thesis.5 
The traditional strict finitist critique, in Gandy’s Thesis, calls for an explicit 
bounding of human cognitive capacities which violates our principle of implicitness. 
In ‘Wang’s Paradox’, Dummett pointed out that the vagueness of predicates such as 
‘feasible’ renders them susceptible to a variant of the Sorites. For Dummett concepts 
such ‘feasible’ are thus semantically incoherent and strict finitism, which admits of 
them, is not viable as a philosophy of mathematics (1978, p. 265). In defense of 
strict finitism, one could point out, however, that Dummett’s strategy has a 
notorious flaw, first pointed out by Crispin Wright in his paper on ‘Strict Finitism’ 
(1993), in this that the presumed incoherence of strict finitist notions is also a 
problem for intuitionism. Instead of rehearsing Wright’s arguments we should like 
simply to point out that Rohit Parikh has already shown in ‘Existence and 
Feasibility’ (1971) that, while the system resulting of the addition to Peano 
arithmetic of the predicate ‘feasible’ is inconsistent, all theorems proved in it whose 
proofs are ‘short’ are in fact true.6 A proof of contradiction Hilbert-style, i.e., of 
something like 0 = 1, would be itself of non-feasible length and could not be 
recognized by anyone consistently adhering to the strict finitist viewpoint. This 
result already goes a long way towards legitimizing the notion of ‘feasibility’ and 
Dummett’s argument loses much of its force. It still does not make the resulting 
system more palatable for foundational purposes; it remains, however, of interest for 
the analysis of computation. The morale that we would like to draw is that in order 
to avoid violating the principle of implicitness bounds should remain hidden, i.e., 
the logic for radical anti-realism should reflect limitations to human cognitive 
capacities in a ‘structural’ fashion. It cannot be the simple matter of, say, adopting 
intuitionistic logic and bounding the length of computations within it, as strict 
finitism is often taken to be. So, in defending a radical anti-realist stance, we are 
emphatically not propounding a variant of Gandy’s Thesis. 
To come back to the principle of immanence. The traditional definition of 
assertability-conditions for mathematical statements reads something like this: a 
statement is assertable if there exists an effective proof of it, that is a finite sequence 
 RADICAL ANTI-REALISM AND SUBSTRUCTURAL LOGICS 4 
of statements of which it is the last and of which every statement follow another as 
the result of an application of a rule of inference —there are, of course, only a finite 
number of such rules. Such as definition fully satisfies the principle of implicitness 
but only partially the principle of immanence. It satisfies it because it does not allow 
for an hypothetical being whose cognitive capacities would be such that it could, 
say, recognize the truth of a universal statement by inspection of an infinity of 
particular cases. The realist could still point out, however, that when the anti-realist 
admits of finite proofs that can be carried out merely in principle he does not fare 
much better than someone who admits of truth-conditions which transcend our 
cognitive capacities. Therefore, in order for the definition fully to satisfy the 
principle of immanence, our cognitive capacities must allow us always to recognize 
a sentence as assertable when it is, that is that one must be able to recognize an 
object Pr(s) which is an effective proof of s, when there is one. As is well-known, 
this is ambiguous, since one may understand this either, as Dummett did, as the 
weaker claim that one has to be able recognize a proof of s when presented with one 
or, as we would argue, as the stronger claim that one must be able to produce or 
reproduce the object Pr(s). 
An argument in favour of this stronger claim can be made along the following 
line:7 for the anti-realist really to distinguish his position from that of the realist on 
this rather crucial point, he must claim not only that circumstances in which an 
assertion is justified must be such that we should recognize them when we are in a 
position to do so, he must also claim that we must always be able in practice to put 
ourselves in such a position whenever such circumstances exist. Otherwise, it would 
be open for the realist to admit there should always exist circumstances under which 
we would recognize that an assertion is justified and merely to deny that we should 
always have the practical capacity to put ourselves in that position. To repeat, the 
weaker claim that one has to be able recognize a proof of s when presented with one 
won’t do, because there may simply be situations where we could recognize a proof 
when presented with one, but we would never be able in practice to put ourselves in 
such a position. Therefore, in order to develop a coherent alternative to the realist, 
the anti-realist must develop a notion of assertability-conditions based on the fact 
that our own cognitive capacities must allow us not only always to recognize a 
sentence as assertable when it is, that is that one must be able to recognize the object 
Pr(s) which is an effective proof of s, when there is one, but also to be able in 
practice to produce or construct the object Pr(s).  
3.  TWO CONCEPTS OF PROOF 
To give a more precise content to our last claim, we propose that one distinguishes 
between two different notions of proof, namely those of proof as ‘object’ and as 
‘act’. According to the first conception, a proof is something like an assemblage of 
strings of symbols satisfying such and such property. From the second, more 
dynamic, conception, a proof is a process whose result may be represented or 
described by means of linguistic symbols. Within the framework of Hilbert-style 
calculi, a proof of s is typically conceived , in accordance with the first conception, 
 RADICAL ANTI-REALISM AND SUBSTRUCTURAL LOGICS 5 
as an object, namely as a series of well-formed formulas terminating with s and 
obeying to simple, decidable properties. We shall argue that this conception is 
invalidated by radical anti-realist strictures. 
The main virtue of Hilbert-style concept of proof lies in their effectiveness. This 
property insures that the proofs may be ratified. As Church once remarked (1956, 
52-3), the existence of a routine procedure allowing to decide whether a given string 
of symbols is in conformity or not with given rules is required as a guaranty for the 
control and the communication of assertions within the mathematical community. 
By putting this property to the fore, one is unavoidably driven to the parasitic idea 
that our activity might be reduced to that of control or ratification, which does not 
require any particular cognitive resources. If the only property of the proof predicate 
is decidability in principle, then the very same abilities that are requested to ratify 
the proofs could easily be conceived as being also sufficient to produce them. For 
the simple capacity to decide in principle if a given sequence of strings is a genuine 
proof or not guarantees also that we are able to enumerate the theorems, e.g., by 
lexicographically enumerating the set of the sequences of well-formed strings and 
by applying to each of them a suitable test of conformity. Thus, the restriction to the 
effective methods of proof, initially intended as a guaranty that the proofs can be 
ratified, may eventually be invoked to claim that we are able to produce them at the 
same (cognitive) cost. To sum up, the mere reference to the decidability in principle 
of the concept of proof does not really allow one to draw a frontier between two 
activities whose difference is, according to us, of paramount importance, namely 
between ratifying and producing. To draw such a frontier, we have to substitute  
feasibility for effectivity in principle; this very distinction goes, as far as proofs are 
concerned, far beyond the framework of the Hilbert-style calculi. 
It is not difficult to show that the limitation to the mere requirement of effectivity 
in principle is at the very root of the so-called ‘Platonism’ of proofs. An effective 
proof in an Hilbert-style calculus may ‘exist’ even if any one equipped with human 
cognitive capacities (or any extension of them such as a computer) could not be in a 
position to produce it within a reasonable time. Therefore, one cannot infer from the 
fact that some one is in practice in a position to recognize a proof in an Hilbert-style 
calculus when presented with one that that person is in practice in a position to 
produce it, even when it is in principle possible. The existence of a proof Pr(s) in an 
Hilbert-style calculus is therefore too large a criterion for the assertability of s. 
Such calculi make room only the ratification of proofs, i.e., for the possibility of 
recognizing a proof when presented with one, but not for the possibility, by any one 
equipped with real human cognitive capacities, of producing it.  
The conception of proofs that underlies Hilbert-style calculi is such that 
consequences of the applications of the rules of inference are not inferred by us but 
they already infer themselves, so to speak. Our task is accordingly not one of 
inferring the consequences of the hypotheses, in accordance with the rules of 
inference: it is merely one of ratifying an already written out but possibly hitherto 
never read proof.8 By identifying proofs to objects independent of us, our activity 
has been reduced to that of control or ratification, which does not require any 
particular cognitive resources. It is precisely in this context that one forges an 
idealized picture our cognitive capacities. 
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Another conception of proofs has its roots in the Brouwer-Heyting-Kolmogorov 
(BHK) interpretation of logical connectives, which consists of defining the act 
justifying the assertion of a statement in terms of the acts justifying the assertion of 
its immediate constituents. Thus, to take only two examples, the act justifying A&B 
is given by the act justifying the assertion of A and by the act justifying the assertion 
of B, and the act justifying A→B is given by a construction transforming any act 
justifying the assertion of A into an act justifying the assertion of B. This is a 
conception of proofs as acts, not as registers of an independent reality. It has been 
validated by the introduction by Gentzen (1969) of natural deduction and sequent 
calculi and it has been developed within the current paradigm of ‘propositions as 
types’, in particular by Per Martin-Löf: 
 
A proof is, not an object, but an act. This is what Brouwer wanted to stress by saying 
that a proof is a mental construction, because what is mental, psychic, is precisely our 
acts, and the word construction, as used by Brouwer, is but a synonym for proof. Thus 
he might just as well have said that the proof of a judgement is the act of proving, or 
grasping, it. And the proof is primarily the act as it is being performed. Only 
secondarily, and irrevocably, does it become the act that has been performed. (Martin-
Löf 1985, p. 231) 
 
We believe that Wittgenstein was the only philosopher in the 20th century who 
tried consistently to develop a non-Platonist conception of rules and proofs. His 
ideas, although dated and often obscurely put, can still be of interest, especially in 
the current context.9 Wittgenstein has been heavily criticized for having said in 
Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics (1978) that one must be able to 
produce or reproduce the object which is the proof of a given assertion (1978, III, § 
1), but his claims amount to nothing more than the radical anti-realist view just 
argued for. According to Wittgenstein, a mathematical proof is not an experiment 
and it must convince us to adopt its conclusion; reproducibility and surveyability are 
properties of proofs linked with this capacity to convince (1978, III, § 55). 
Understanding a proof means to be able to take it in (1978 I, § 80 & III, § 9), to be 
able to reproduce it, etc. In essence, Wittgenstein is claiming that to understand a 
proof means more than the mere capacity to ratify it. Many salient aspects of the 
later Wittgenstein’s philosophy of mathematics are also put in proper perspective 
within the confines of this debate. We have in mind not only the argument about the 
surveyability of proofs —see, e.g., his (1978, III, §§ 2, 3, 14, 16, 18, 19, 43)—, 
which is linked, for obvious reasons, with the requirement that one must be able to 
produce or reproduce proofs but also his controversial ‘rule-following’ argument 
(Wittgenstein), which is aimed at the conception of ‘rules as rails’ —as in, e.g.,  
(1953, §§ 218-219)—, which, in turn, characterizes very well the Platonist 
conception underlying Hilbert-style calculi. There is no space for a discussion of 
these aspects of Wittgenstein’s philosophy or the conception of proofs as acts, we 
leave this topic for a further paper. At this stage, our claim is that one should strive 
to define assertability-conditions not in terms of the ‘static’, Platonic conception 
underlying Hilbert-style calculi but in terms of this ‘dynamic’ conception of proofs 
as acts. A thorough switch to the latter should be, according to us, at the very heart 
of the debate within anti-realism.  
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We would like further to claim that part of the reasons why the traditional anti-
realist has difficulties truly to distinguish his case from that of the realist has to do 
with the fact that he surreptitiously relies on the conception of proofs that underlies 
Hilbert-style calculi. Crispin Wright has already pointed out that, indeed, the 
traditional anti-realist slips into this sort of thinking when having in mind, for 
example, so-called ‘decidable’ arithmetical predicates. The anti-realist merely 
requests, in their case, the possession of a guaranty that the proofs can be ratified, in 
which case, it is assumed that 
 
we have, as it were, only a spectator’s role to play; that we are capable of so conferring 
a meaning on the symbols involved in the statement as to decide the statement’s truth, 
or falsity, ahead of ourselves and independently of whatever verdict we reach on 
actually doing the computation if we are able to. […] which result is correct in no sense 
awaits our judgement; when we do the computation, we merely trace out connections to 
which, by the meanings which we have given to the relevant signs […], we have already 
committed ourselves. (Wright 1993, p. 144) 
 
It is precisely because it relies implicitly on this Platonic conception of proofs 
that traditional anti-realism fails to provide strict enough a criteria for assertability. 
It therefore be criticized and abandoned if one wishes to hold a radical anti-realist 
stance. 
4. AN ANTI-REALIST LOOK AT STRUCTURAL RULES 
Dummett’s paper on ‘The Philosophical Basis of Intuitionistic Logic’ opens with the 
question: “What plausible rationale can there be for repudiating, within 
mathematical reasoning, the canons of classical logic in favour of those of 
intuitionistic logic?” (1978, p. 215). We propose that one ask instead: What sort of 
logic will one end up with, if one adheres to radical anti-realism? It makes sense to 
ask such a question today, as opposed to the days when Dummett wrote, because 
there is a growing interest in non-classical logics, while not so many years ago all 
logics except classical, and perhaps intuitionistic logic, were considered as simply 
esoteric. 
Our arguments have been so far to the effect that, in order to comply with the 
principle of implicitness, one ought to avoid explicit bounding of the length of 
computations and look for structural weakening instead and, furthermore, that in 
order to comply with the principle of immanence, one ought to avoid the 
idealizations that arise when one is surreptitiously relying on the Platonic conception 
of proofs that underlies Hilbert-style calculi. A new approach to the above question 
suggests itself quite naturally in this context, which was first postulated as a thesis 
by Kosta Dosen, namely that  
 
Two logical systems are alternative if, and only if, they differ only in their assumptions 
on structural deductions. (1989, p. 376) 
 
In a nutshell, while Dummett and traditional anti-realists argued for intuitionism by 
looking at logical rules in natural deduction calculi, we propose that one looks 
instead at structural rules in sequent calculi. If one looks at sequent formulations of 
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various logics, one notices that the ‘logical’ rules may be made not to differ from 
those given for classical logic —in other words the logical rules are ‘invariant’— 
while the ‘structural’ rules change. Non-classical logics consist of restrictions put on 
the structural rules of classical logic.10 
The alternative ‘substructural’ logics that can be obtained by restricting 
structural rules are numerous and include intuitionistic logic, relevant logic, BCK 
logic, linear logic, and the Lambek calculus of syntactic categories. From this 
‘substructural’ point of view, it is only reasonable to ask: Why should the anti-realist 
peg his case only on intuitionistic logic and not explore these various other avenues? 
It is quite noticeable that from the point of view of substructural logics, intuitionistic 
logic differs from classical logic merely by restricting the rule of Thinning on the 
right from: 
 
Γ  |—   ∆ 
____________ 
 




Γ  |— 
________ 
 
Γ  |—   A 
 
(This restriction is explained by the requisite that sequents must have only one 
conclusion.) Again, one might legitimately ask: Why should one stop here? By 
stopping the movement towards further restrictions of the structural rules where he 
does, the intuitionist will appear to be adopting an ad hoc and potentially fatally 
unstable stance. Much could be said at this stage, we shall, however, merely explore 
briefly, for reasons of space, the consequences of the second part of our argument, 
(the rejection of the Platonist conception of proofs) upon the possibility of further  
restrictions on structural rules.  
In talking earlier about Platonic idealizations of our cognitive capacities, we had 
in mind idealizations that are hidden in what Prawitz called, in Natural Deduction, 
‘improper inference rules’ (1965, p. 23), i.e., those rules which do not state how 
assumptions are to be discharged. For example, the introduction rule for implication 
stipulates that if B has been inferred from A, it is possible to construct a new 
deduction whose conclusion will be A→B, which will not depend any more from A, 
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. 
B 
 _____    → I 
 
A → B 
 
(Other improper inference rules are ∨E, ∀I, and ∃E.) The tree-like structure of 
derivations is such that a given derivation may contain many occurrences of a given 
hypothesis. Now in intuitionistic logic, as embodied in Gentzen’s calculus, the 
discharge of the hypothesis is merely optional. By making the discharge obligatory 
one obtains a different logic. With the obligatory discharge, which is the hallmark of 
relevant logic, one cannot prove B → A from A, i.e., one cannot construct a 





B → A 
_________ 
 
A → (B → A) 
 
whose conclusion is one of C. I. Lewis’ paradoxes of relevance: if a statement is true 
then it is implied by any other statement. Gentzen himself felt uneasy about what he 
called the lack of “factual dependence” between B and A. It should be pointed out 
that there are obvious anti-realist reasons to require the obligatory discharge: the 
cognitive resources needed for justifying A alone may turn out to be insufficient for 
the justification of A on the basis of B, since the cognitive resources needed for B 
may be lacking. 
To limit oneself to a single discharge leads to Girard’s linear logic (Girard 1987, 
1995). Girard’s motivation consists in pointing out (1995, 1f.) that from the 
perspective of the physical execution of the rule, if I have $ 2 and a pack of 
Gauloises cigarettes costs $ 1, then the result of buying only one pack of Gauloises 
is that one lose only $ 1. In linear logic one cannot get A → B from (A & A) → B 
because there is no reason to believe that what can be obtained by two occurrences, 
A & A, can be obtained by merely one occurence of A. Thus, there is an element of 
idealization in intuitionistic logic and the optional discharge, which allows one to 
believe that one can obtain something from one use of A, when it is known only that 
it can be obtained only from two uses of A. In other words, if a pack of Gauloises 
costs $ 2, one cannot buy it with $ 1. It should thus be clear that, in cases such as 
that of allowing the optional discharge, one obtains more than one is strictly entitled 
to and if one really wishes to follow a radical anti-realist course, such allowances 
must simply be forbidden. 
It turns out that Gentzen’s sequent calculi advantageously bring to the fore the 
rules responsible for these idealizations, i.e., they bring to the fore what is hidden 
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within the natural rules. For example, the optional discharge has the structural rule 
of Thinning on the left as a counterpart in the sequent calculus: 
 
Γ  |—   ∆ 
____________ 
 
Γ, A |—   ∆  
 
Relevant logic and linear logic differ from intuitionistic logic in this that they both 
reject not just Thinning on the right but also Thinning on the left, so that one does 
not have  A→(B→A) and A→(¬A→B).11 
Linear logic goes further, however, than relevant logic, as Contraction on both 
sides is also rejected (more precisely, they are transformed into the ‘exponentials’ ? 
and !). Now, inasmuch as the optional discharge has the structural rule of Thinning 
on the left as a counterpart in the sequent calculus, the obligatory discharge has the 
rule of Contraction on the left as a counterpart: 
 
Γ, A, A  |—    ∆ 
_______________ 
 
Γ, A |—   ∆ 
 
It is also rejected in linear logic, in which discharge is obligatory but not multiple. 
The movement towards a greater restriction of structural rules, which led to the 
rejection of Thinning and Contraction on both sides within linear logic, seems at 
first blush nicely to fit the argument for the radicalization of anti-realism that we 
have sketched, as one can clearly identify the structural rules responsible for the 
vestiges of Platonism that are still present in intuitionism. Clearly, criteria for 
assertability modelled on sequent rules in some system of linear logic are desirable 
from our radical anti-realist perspective. We could not even begin here to discuss 
this point in any detailed manner, but we hope that this newly established link 
between radical anti-realism and substructural logics will renew the debate about 
realism within proof-theoretical semantics. 
 
 




1 This definition of the realist position, taken from Dummett, implies that a distinction between 
‘decidable’ and ‘undecidable’ sentences can be drawn. A sentence is decidable just in case we have 
already provided a proof or a refutation of it or we are in possession of an effective method for it,  and it 
is undecidable just in case it is not decidable. In other words, a sentence is decidable just in case we know 
or have reason to think that either we can recognize it to be true or we can recognize it to be false.On the 
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difficulties linked with this definition, see (Shieh 1998a). 
2 These papers are collected in (Dummett 1978). Dummett has given a definitive statement of his position 
in The Logical Basis of Metaphysics (1991). Among Prawitz’s papers, see especially (Prawitz 1977).  
3 See Crispin Wright’s paper on ‘Strict Finitism’ (1993, 107-175) and Neil Tennant’s Anti-Realism and 
Logic (1987) and The Taming of the True (1997). 
4 The Karp-Cook Thesis originated in (Edmonds 1965) and (Cook 1975), it is stated in (Davis 1982, p. 
23). The expression ‘Gandy’s Thesis’ is ours, in memory of the late Robin Gandy, who stated this thesis 
in ‘Limitations to Mathematical Knowledge’ (1982, p. 130). 
5 The identification of feasible computing with the Aristotelian notion of infinity comes out quite clearly 
in (Leivant 1994). Although we wish not to proceed along following Gandy’s Thesis, we also have 
reservations concerning the Karp-Cook Thesis, which is not entirely satisfactory from the radical point of 
view presented in this paper. 
6 For further improvements on Parikh’s result, see (Dragalin 1985) and  (Sazonov 1995). 
7 The argument presented in the remainder of this section is spelled out in a much more detailed manner 
in (Dubucs 1997) to which the reader is referred. 
8  This conception originates in bolzano. See (Dubucs, to appear). 
9 We are leaving aside all exegetical matters. For a more detailed discussion, see (Marion 1998). 
10 Gabriella Crocco (1999) has convincingly argued that the debate about logical revisionism should be 
framed in this way. 
11 It is worth noticing here that some of the first intuitionistic logicians raised the question of the 
admissibility of both A→(B→A) and A→(¬A→B). In 1925, Kolmogorov rejected A→(¬A→B), which 
corresponds to Thinning on the right, but did not reject A→(B→A), i.e. Thinning on the left. In 1929, 
Glivenko, whose axiomatization was the one used by Gentzen, raised similar points but decided in the 
end to follow Heyting in keeping both A→(B→A) and A→(¬A→B). These historical remarks are taken 
from (Dosen 1993). Unsurprisingly, it was another Russian intuitionist, I. E. Orlov, who provided the first 
axiomatization of relevant logic, in 1928. On this, see (Dosen 1992). 
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